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ABSTRACT 
 Allusions to death delivered by bits and bytes have been in vogue since the Reagan 
administration. Yet, as the internet and its connected devices have since proliferated, cyber 
violence remains far more fiction than fact. Nevertheless, prominent U.S. officials have all 
but assured the eventuality of a devastating attack. In anticipation, political, legal, and 
industry experts are now seeking to codify and inculcate international norms to govern acts 
of war prosecuted via cyberspace. Two of the most prominent governance models to 
emerge are the Tallinn Manual and Microsoft’s Digital Geneva Convention. The driving 
thesis of this research argues that within the monolith of the internet, there lie situations 
that can be examined through the lens of New Institutional Economics and commons 
governance, lending to rigorous and outcomes-based policy analysis. Through the 
application of Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework, this paper 
individually evaluates the two governance models in question and offers a theory as to the 
likely efficacy of each approach. This research ultimately finds that the Tallinn Manual 
achieves its narrow and explicit aims of demonstrating how international law applies to 
cyberspace while falling short of reaching its full potential as a governance institution. The 
Digital Geneva Convention is unlikely to meet its objective of becoming a binding 
international agreement, though the associated, newly founded CyberPeace Institute could 
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“At no time in the last two centuries has it been easy to predict whether a major weapon 
will determine the course of a coming war, let alone be employed.” 
-Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 
 
 In the early evening hours of April 22, 1915, just north of the Belgian town of 
Ypres, the German Army unleashed a “strange green cloud of death,”1 which wafted low 
over the Flemish countryside, choking the life out of everything in its path. The use of 
chlorine gas that day defied Germany’s own accession to the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907, the former specifically banning the employment of poison and asphyxiating 
gases as means of injuring the enemy.2 Such renegation quickly became the rule rather 
than the exception with France, Britain, and eventually most major powers relying on 
chemical weapons of some form or another for the remainder of the First World War. 
This example invites speculation as to whether or not even the most overt diplomatic 
actions can guarantee the cooperation of warring parties to obey limits of violence. Ever 
elusive, peace in our time. The world now stands at the precipice of a new era of 
technological weaponry —autonomous robots, malware, sophisticated cyberattacks — 
the costs of which are yet to be known. The question is whether or not modern diplomats 
can square the circle of channeling international outrages such that violence, if necessary, 
is directed and limited, avoiding wanton death, especially of noncombatants. At a time of 
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great uncertainty, two prominent models — the Tallinn Manual and the Digital Geneva 
Convention — now strive to codify international norms for the conduct of cyber warfare. 
This paper offers a view of cyber warfare as a problem of commons governance, 
evaluates the likely efficacy of the models in question, and seeks to advance the global 
conversation of how best to prevent unnecessary harm in the information age. 
 To date, the total number of casualties (that is, deaths or injuries) reported as a 
direct result of a cyberattack stands at zero.3 The total number of cyberattacks credibly 
alleged to have caused physical destruction of any kind stands at two. The first such attack, 
referred to as Operation Olympic Games, or Stuxnet, took place in late 2009 at a uranium 
enrichment facility in Iran, causing breakage of nearly 1,000 industrial centrifuge 
cylinders.4 The second, for which details remain extraordinarily scant, took place in 2014 
at a yet unnamed steel mill in Germany, causing “massive physical damage.”5 The paucity 
of physical transgression (even evidence for those alleged cases) notwithstanding, cyber 
prognosticators warn of an increasingly dire international situation in which nation-state 
attacks are certain to progress in severity to the point of becoming a new kind of violent 
political instrument: Cyber War. Over the past 10 years, government officials, including 
former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, former Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano, and former head of both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, Admiral Michael 
Rogers, have popularized phrases such as “Cyber Pearl Harbor” and “Cyber 9/11.”678 The 
analogies and coincident assurances of “when, not if” have wound their way into serious 
discussion, while also prompting some not-so-sotto-voce criticism.9 The imagery is clear 
enough. At the highest levels of U.S. national security, the belief is that new technology 
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offers new ways for international political opponents to unleash unforeseen and physically 
devastating attacks on one another. 
The luxury of relative peace has given legal, academic, military, and industry 
experts time to consider the consequences of cyber-physical attacks. This thinking has 
elicited two prominent constructs (technically, models) aiming in their own ways to deter, 
or at least dissuade nations from utilizing the kinds of technology and tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) capable of delivering death via digital means. Those models are 
The Tallinn Manual and the Digital Geneva Convention (DGC). These models approach 
the issue of cyber warfare from different vantage points; the former a legal translation of 
international law as it pertains to jus ad bellum and jus in bello and the latter a private 
sector initiative to inculcate global norms dealing more narrowly with international 
humanitarian law (IHL). In that sense, the Tallinn Manual captures all that the DGC seeks 
to address and therefore both deal with the appropriate conduct of cyber warfare pursuant 
to the protection of noncombatants. With assistance from the field of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), the research presented in this paper examines these governance models, 
taking into account their differing approaches and analyzing contextual variables, 
ultimately evaluating the likely efficacy of each in their IHL-related endeavors. A hopeful 
byproduct of this paper is to influence the ever-populating arena of would-be governors of 
cyber warfare in the fundamental economic question of how to efficiently allocate 
resources; principally now: attention. 
The Tallinn Manual was first published in 2013 as the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare; the product of four years of scholarly 
collaboration by an International Group of Experts (IGE) led by international law scholar 
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Michael N. Schmitt. Its second and most recent version, superseding, while including and 
expanding upon and beyond the precepts of the first, was published in 2017 as the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 on the Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. References throughout this paper 
to the “Tallinn Manual” indicate the latter version. The Tallinn Manual consists of 154 
rules divided into 20 categories ranging from Sovereignty and Jurisdiction to the Law of 
Armed Conflict and Occupation. Each rule addresses a specific legal issue at the nexus of 
international law and cyber operations, then provides discussion and interpretation, 
commenting only on the lex lata and “assiduously” avoiding the lex ferenda.10 A 
motivating example of both the structure and breadth of the manual is found in Rule 58 (a), 
which states that “Cyber operations on the moon and other celestial bodies may be 
conducted only for peaceful purposes,” citing Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.11 
While assembled at the behest and published under the auspices of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD 
COE), the authors of the Tallinn Manual make clear it is an independent, nonbinding 
expression of expert opinion. It is not an official document.12 The primary audience of the 
Tallinn Manual is “State legal advisors,” though it does make room for broader 
consumption.13 
The Digital Geneva Convention has aimed at broad consumption from the start. As 
presswork was underway on the second edition of the Tallinn Manual, Microsoft President 
Brad Smith introduced the DGC via keynote speech at RSA Conference in San Francisco. 
Unlike the Tallinn Manual, a concerted, long-term, international effort and evolutionary 
work, the DGC appeared seemingly ex nihilo.14 Citing the “expansion of nation-state 
attacks” Smith exhorted private sector technology companies to call on governments to, 
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“come together, affirm international cybersecurity norms that have emerged in recent 
years, adopt new and binding rules, and get to work implementing them.”15 He listed six 
specific tenets of the proposed Digital Geneva Convention, among them: “No targeting of 
tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure,” and, “Assist private sector efforts 
to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from events.”16 Later in 2017, Mr. Smith went 
to Geneva to present the DGC to the United Nations. 
While critical reception for the Tallinn Manual has been generally positive, it has 
also generally been limited to legal and security blogs and publications. Though the 
Washington Post was quick to ask how its guidelines may apply to nations meddling in 
elections. the DGC was met with greater fanfare from prominent publications such as 
WIRED magazine, which quickly asserted “Microsoft Is Right: We Need a Digital Geneva 
Convention.”17 The same year, the World Economic Forum (WEF) pressed the issue with 
a blog entitled “Why we urgently need a Digital Geneva Convention.”18 Some, however, 
questioned the necessity and utility of the DGC, including the CCD COE, which called the 
move “both legally confusing and politically unrealistic.”19 Since announcing the DGC, 
Microsoft has led several tangential initiatives such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the 
Digital Peace Now “movement,” and establishment of the Geneva-based CyberPeace 
Institute. What Microsoft’s approach to the DGC lacks in the historical foundations found 
in the Tallinn Manual, it attempts to make up for with the kind of rapid iteration iconic of 
Silicon Valley (or Redmond, as it were). 
For all the ways in which the Tallinn Manual and the DGC differ in their approach, 
they have one significant commonality: they are both models of governance put forth by 
aspiring global governors. Governance scholar Deborah Avant, of the University of 
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Denver, defines global governors as “authorities who exercise power across borders for 
purposes of affecting policy.”20 This may not be clear at first due to wide variances between 
progenitors (a group of legal and academic experts versus the president of a tech company), 
development processes (heterogenous colloquia versus homogenous corporate 
decisioning), and explicit aims (mapping the lex lata to modern issues versus calling on 
government action). But each in its own way approximates the situation of cyber warfare, 
framing it with distinguishable exogenous and endogenous variables, their relationships, 
and expected outcomes. Here, the mere act of framing is itself an attempt to influence 
behavior in a particular arena, viz. international politics. It is striking to consider the 
different conditions under which the International Group of Experts and Microsoft 
simultaneously came to publish similar implicit assessments about the increasing 
probability of cyber warfare. The two models establish a spectrum of action ranging from 
promotion of messaging intended to reify and osmose international norms, to the call for 
an independent global governance regime to promulgate and even enforce a set of binding 
rules. 
Governance itself tends to be a function of leadership and authority. Avant notes, 
“…authority [is] the ability to induce deference in others.”21 Therefore, a key component 
of any analysis of governance models is aptitude to induce deference. In the edited volume 
Who Governs the Globe? Avant introduces multiple types of authority — institutional, 
delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based — while instructing that a combination 
of these is far more prevalent than any single type. Governance issues are examined in 
depth as part of the Analysis section of this paper, but it is useful to be aware of the types 
of authority implicitly exhibited by each model. The Tallinn Manual serves as a prime 
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example of expert authority while the Digital Geneva Convention may be seen as a 
delegated authority that borrows the principled authority (really, the brand) of the 
established Geneva Conventions. By initially framing this issue in the context of 
governance problems, it both motivates the desired outcome of establishing international 
norms and aligns with existing literature in the field of economics that enables more 
discrete measurement and investigation. 
As is often the case with security scholarship, an overarching challenge lies in 
proving a negative and avoiding successful proclamations of cum hoc ergo propter hoc. 
Prediction can be a fool’s errand. As the philosopher Laozi admonished, “Those who have 
knowledge, don’t predict. Those who predict, don’t have knowledge.”22 Fortunately, the 
dismal science is never afraid to play the fool. The discipline of New Institutional 
Economics — that which theorizes about norms and rules governing the nature of property 
ownership, transaction costs, and institutions themselves — and specifically the study of 
how to effectively govern common pool resources (CPR), offers a robust, rigorous, and 
roundly tested evaluative framework well suited for normalizing and analyzing these two 
models. 
Powering the Analysis section of this paper is one of the most well-known 
evaluative tools to emerge from NIE scholarship dealing with CPR management: Elinor 
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Ostrom, whose Nobel 
Prize-winning academic work focused largely on the organization of governance systems 
for common pool resources, recognized that, “one needs a common framework…in order 
to address questions of reform and transition. Particular models then help the analyst to 
deduce specific predictions about likely outcomes of highly simplified structures.”23 
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Without minimizing the years of work that have gone into them, both the Tallinn Manual 
and Digital Geneva Convention are highly simplified structures in their own ways: the 
Tallinn Manual a legal reference book and the DGC a confederation of speeches, policy 
papers, and organizations. Each model addresses issues of reform and transition. Here, 
reform may seek to answer questions of how best to change current legal and diplomatic 
constructs such that nations consciously minimize collateral damage caused by cyber 
warfare.24 Transition may seek to answer questions of how to bring awareness to the nature 
of the changing battlefield so that nations are held accountable for actions that violate 
existing international law. The IAD presents a well-defined framework for normalizing and 
analyzing how and how well governance systems function. The ability to accurately assess 
preventive regimes and promulgate the kinds of institutions and norms that have the highest 
likelihood of reducing negative outcomes becomes more important with each passing 
moment that the number of cyber war casualties remains zero. 
The research untaken herein is interdisciplinary by nature, with debts to the studies 
of international relations, international security (esp. warfare and cybersecurity), global 
governance, institutional economics, public policy, and international humanitarian law. 
However, it also strives to be as accessible as possible. Therefore, key concepts are 
explained throughout, with motivating examples similar to those found in this introduction. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The complete set of introductory chapters consist 
of the preceding overview, next a review of the economic underpinnings of the research 
design, making the case for viewing cyberwarfare as an issue of CPR governance. With 
the necessary justification for invoking the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework in place, the Methodology presents definitions of terms and a diagram that will 
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make four-star Clausewitzians swoon. It also delineates specific process steps and 
evaluative criteria. The subsequent section on The Evolution of Governance in Cyberspace 
explains how global governance works. It tours major milestones in the development of 
cyber governance from a matter with origins in U.S. national security to managing 
problems of cybercrime and now to the establishment of international norms. This leads to 
a section that presents more in-depth background on both the Tallinn Manual and the 
Digital Geneva Convention. In the Analysis section, each model is independently fitted to 
the IAD framework and evaluated against the criteria defined in the Methodology section. 
Finally, the conclusion restates the findings of the analysis and inquires as to the 
appropriateness of corporate involvement in global governance as it relates to warfare 
before offering a few final thoughts on New Institutional Economics and lessons learned 

















ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
 
Tragic Origins of Common Pool Resource Theory 
What is a common pool resource? Why is the concept so prevalent and even at 
times controversial among scholars of political science and economics? Principally, the 
issue of what makes a CPR comes down to property ownership and rights of use. The 
inherent dilemma is well defined by Adam Smith, writing in Wealth of Nations, “It is 
[every individual’s] own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in 
view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to 
prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.”25 Smith’s positivism 
makes no conjecture as to the ways in which self-interest and societal good may peaceably 
abide. For centuries thereafter, and not until the mid-20th, the debate over allocation of 
resources largely remained one of private versus public interest. A house, a ship, a business, 
these may be understandably privately owned. Unclaimed land, navigable waterways, the 
high seas, domains of the public; sometimes undefined altogether. Yet, shared spaces in 
which competing parties seek to extract some utility have long existed, most prominently 
in the form of grazing land and fisheries.  
The descriptive term ‘commons’ became popular in 1968 when ecologist Garrett 
Hardin wrote his now infamous Tragedy of the Commons for Science magazine. Hardin’s 
Tragedy refers most directly to an economic problem related to the efficient allocation of 
scarce resources, especially within shared, public environments. Hardin’s article deals 
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squarely with the most extreme kind of commons problem, viz. the Malthusian trap. The 
tragedy as he saw it was the harmful effect of exponential population growth on Earth’s 
resources. His paper served to frame the problem of resource management, giving life to 
the concept of common pool resources as generally anarchic situations where the extraction 
of materials is zero-sum, and participants may not be easily excluded. Though not explicitly 
attributable to Hardin, Figure 1 shows the expansion of exchange type variation that occurs 
between the qualities of subtractability and excludability across four categories: public 
goods, club/toll goods, private goods, and common pool resources. Hardin’s ultimate 
assessment, crucial to the research that would follow, was rather dire in that common pool 
resources, though momentarily distinct, are destined for either government control, 
complete private ownership, or spiraling degradation. Hardin reveals his own extreme 
convictions, ultimately adjudging that “Freedom to breed will bring ruin to all”26 before 
launching into a proto-Skinnerian salvo on mass coercion while making some reasonable 
points about the annoyance of supermarket Muzak. There’s got to be a better way. 
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Figure 1 Note: It is important to recognize that this discrete representation belies the fact 
that massively dispersed, complex systems may at any particular time, exhibit qualities of 
one, more than one, or even none of the categories described. 
 
As a brief interlude and motivating example for thinking about the categories of 
property interaction from the physical world (though it does offer Wi-Fi), consider the aptly 
named Boston Common, a 50-acre park, which sits across from the great gold-domed State 
House in downtown Boston, Massachusetts. Founded in 1634, it is the oldest public park 
in the United States. It is owned by the City of Boston and managed by the Boston Parks 
Department. Boston Common is generally recognized as public property. Anyone may 
freely enter, making it difficult to exclude any particular member of the public. And one 
person’s enjoyment of the park does not necessarily take away from the enjoyment of 
anyone else. In the language of commons analysis within the school of New Institutional 
Economics, Boston Common would be said to exhibit low excludability and low 
subtractability. For some, this would end the investigation. This is clearly public property. 
However, the Common is technically closed between the hours of 11:00 PM and 5:00 AM 
and violators of those bounds may be cited for trespassing. This increases excludability 
and moves the Common from public property towards a club good. Yet, even during 
normal hours of operation, not all of Boston Common is equally desirable ground. There 
are two tennis courts with a fence around them that operate on a first come, first serve basis. 
In theory, excludability is therefore low while subtractability may be high if one is forced 
to wait for a court. The dynamism of economic systems and spectrum of commons analysis 
is a recurring theme in this paper. 
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Wittingly or otherwise, The Tragedy of the Commons threw down the gauntlet for 
others to find a more reasonable solution. It does so most pointedly in its restatement of 
Wiesner and York’s assessment that the nuclear arms race posed a dilemma with “no 
technical solution.”27 Hardin defines a technical solution as “one that requires a change 
only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of 
change in human values or ideas of morality.”28 There are many juxtapositions that can 
help codify meaning behind Hardin’s words. Hard versus soft sciences. Science versus art. 
Objective versus subjective. False dichotomies these may be, but they remain useful 
heuristics. Problems that lend themselves to precise control and experimentation by 
limitation of variables are those with technical solutions. Problems too unwieldy for the 
laboratory due to imperfect information, belief-based assumptions, and high variability 
(even given consistent application of processes) may be recognized as those without 
technical solutions.  
Hardin illustrates the utility of thinking outside the bounds of technical solutions 
with an example from the game of tick-tack-toe [sic], offering a situation in which an 
opponent has perfect information about the game (i.e. total knowledge of the set and 
sequence of all opponent moves). He notes that, for any challenger, winning in such a case 
would be impossible. The opponent, having perfect information, would know exactly 
where to move every time in order to guarantee a win. The game would be unwinnable 
unless the challenger were to step outside the bounds of the game as it were understood 
and rewrite the definition of winning altogether. For a modern example, if supercomputers 
beat the world’s best human chess players 100% of the time, then humans could simply 
exclude computers from competition, preserving the ability for humans to claim 
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dominance. Given recent advancements in artificial intelligence technology, one might see 
such a rule as a form of cheating, but preclusion of non-human entities from human 
competition is the rule rather than the exception. Deep Blue and AlphaGo are interesting 
modern exhibitions, but do not in any way seem to threaten the official standings of Magnus 
Carlsen or Tang Weixing.29 
So, it is apparent that the class of “no technical solution” problems necessitates a 
sort of gamesmanship in the game making itself; certainly, with the playing. What that 
means for the management of common pool resources is that it may be as much an art as it 
is a science, echoing the Aristotelian sentiment that “art is the study of things with starting 
points in the producer and not the thing being produced.”30 Wiesner and York’s challenge 
of understanding the atmospheric and biological effects of nuclear tests differed entirely 
from the development of an international system that could control the testing itself by 
imperfect and irrational humans. They were the first to make the case that technological 
solutions to this latter set of problems would spell doom. Nevertheless, it is critical to 
recognize that Wiesner and York ended their 1964 article on an optimistic note. They were 
hopeful that the partial nuclear test ban treaty would be a first step toward solving the 
security dilemma; international agreements offering solutions not otherwise found in the 
hard sciences that split the atom. Decades later, historian Richard Rhodes would call the 
[partial test ban treaty] and non-proliferation treaty the “most effective treaties in 
preventing rampant nuclear proliferation.”31 Recognizing the fear that paralyzed 
generations during the Cold War, the idea that treaties and similar governance models can 
provide viable solutions (in some cases, perhaps the only ones) to preventing international 
conflict is an historical lesson worth heeding. 
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A New Hope: Elinor Ostrom and Institutional Analysis 
If Tragedy set out to quell the optimism of Wiesner and York, it served only to 
ignite interest in one young scholar in particular: Elinor Ostrom. Having received her PhD 
in political science from UCLA three years prior to Hardin’s publication, Ostrom, along 
with husband Vincent, was already laying the groundwork for a way of managing the 
commons. A review of Ostrom’s early academic interests provides insight into the 
evolution of her thinking in terms of organized systems, management of exchange, and 
how to approach common pool resources. In 1965, she published A Behavioral Approach 
to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations. In 1968, Constitutional Decision-Making: A 
Logic for the Organization of Collective Enterprises. And in 1971, A Theory for 
Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems. The breadth of Ostrom’s research, from 
fisheries to forests to irrigation practices, demonstrates the prevalence of common pool 
resource issues as well as the applicability of the methods she devised. This quality of 
abstraction is perhaps best demonstrated in her work with law enforcement.  
In fact, some of the earliest rudiments of what would become her Pietic 
contribution, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, can be found in her 
1978 work with Parks, Whitaker, and Percy, Formation of Police and Law Enforcement 
Policy.32 Ostrom’s work cast serious doubt on Hardin’s tragic assertions, becoming the 
chief proponent for the notion that common pool resources could be sustainably managed 
by their own participants. The IAD framework fleshed out in the early 1980s, harmonized 
three key areas: common pool resource management, game theory, and collective action.33 
In 1985, Ostrom published Formulating the Elements of Institutional Analysis as part of a 
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collection of essays edited by her and Vincent, entitled Studies in Institutional Analysis and 
Development.34 Her essay in particular makes the case for concentrated, empirical study of 
institutions by presenting the need to do so and supplying the foundational elements thereof 
(these elements are defined and described in greater technical detail in the forthcoming 
Methodology section of this paper). The need, according to Ostrom, centers on 
interdisciplinary coordination.35 
 In 1990, Ostrom published her seminal work, Governing the Commons. In it, she 
presents possible ways of overcoming the tragedy of the commons, primarily by means of 
self-organization and self-regulation, noting “some individuals have created institutions, 
committed themselves to follow rules, and monitored their own conformance to their 
agreements, as well as their conformance to the rules in a CPR situation.”36 She is explicit, 
however, that there are no simple, or even elegant solutions to the problem of allocating 
resources in a commons situation. Ostrom addresses proponents of privatization as well as 
those who believe in a more command economy-style approach, citing each as potential 
solutions within a larger set of solutions based on specific problems. In her own words, 
“Instead of presuming that the individuals sharing a commons are inevitably caught in a 
trap from which they cannot escape. I argue that the capacity of individuals to extricate 
themselves from various types of dilemma situations varies from situation to situation.”37 
This should not be construed to mean that commons problems cannot be abstracted in some 
sense or that they are intractable. Indeed, Ostrom made significant progress in the meta-
analysis of CPR research and would come to reconcile challenges of high variability within 
the analytical concept of polycentricity. In short, that social systems in particular tend to 
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be recursively nested and woven together in ways that do not comport with simplistic linear 
or hierarchical views.38 
 Since Ostrom’s work in the 1970s and 80s, the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework has become one of the central tools in the field of New 
Institutional Economics for understanding how institutions governing the commons can 
operate sustainably and efficiently. The framework is essentially similar to a mathematical 
function, defining the inputs, operations, and outputs of a particular governance regime. 
Translations to IAD terminology follow: 
• Inputs 
o Biophysical/Material Characteristics 
o Attributes of the Community 
o Rules 
• Operations 
o Evaluative Criteria 
• Outputs 
o Patterns of Interaction 
o Outcomes 
 
Yet the IAD goes beyond basic input/output, defining not only the function of the 
institution in question, but also the situation to which it is specifically tailored. In technical 
terms, this is referred to as the Action Arena, which is made up of Actors and Action 
Situations. Defining all of these attributes reduces variability, making empirical analysis 
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more accessible. Additionally, the IAD incorporates feedback loops making it possible to 
turn otherwise static governance systems into teachable institutions.  
While various visual representations exist based on interpretations of Ostrom’s 




 A brief recap of the situation thus far. For centuries, economists have attempted to 
understand the nature of property ownership and interactions among those who have 
interest in said property, viz. the extraction of some utility. Until the mid-20th century, this 
conversation was generally binary, explaining ownership and access as either public or 
private. The introduction of the commons opened the door for a more nuanced view, 
recognizing anarchic systems where individuals interact to gain utility but seek no private 
ownership, thereby ostensibly leading to greater collective benefits of use. Hardin viewed 
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this as necessarily destructive given man’s self-serving nature and called for extreme 
measures to control societal behavior.  
 Ostrom countered this assertion, positing her own view, backed by field work, that 
commons can be effectively governed by their own participants. She produced the 
Institutional Analysis and Development framework to aid in the evaluation of economic 
systems (i.e. systems of exchange). It by application of the IAD that researchers can better 
understand and evaluate the mechanics of a particular system and predict outcomes.  
 The following section introduces modern research and uses reason by analogy to 
tie the key common pool resource concepts to problems in cyberspace, viz. cyber warfare. 
 
Cyberspace as a Commons 
A crucial point to make at this juncture is that while Ostrom’s work centers on the 
effective management of common pool resources, the IAD is by no means limited in its 
applicability to a particular kind of analysis. The reason that common pool resources are 
interesting likely comes down to the relative novelty of CPRs in economics, their 
ambiguous governance logic, the Nobel Prize committee’s recognition of Ostrom’s work, 
and, realistically, Hardin’s pithy phrasing. However, the IAD could reasonably be applied 
to any private situation, public situation, or club situation. Similarly, as will be shown in 
this section, some have taken to vociferously advocating or decrying the analysis of 
cyberspace as a function of common pool resource management. A central premise of this 
paper is that complex systems lend to a variety of kinds of analysis and mutual exclusion 
approaches Ostrom’s admonishments about panacea thinking. Ultimately, the four 
categories in Figure 1 are better thought of as lenses than boxes. There is a deliberate 
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choice here to view cyberspace through the lens of CPR governance because situations 
specific to cyber warfare do in certain circumstances exhibit those hallmarks of high 
subtractability and low excludability. Opposing views are presented here as an exercise of 
due diligence, but also to call attention to the problem of monolithic analysis. 
In 2012, venture capitalist and former Intel executive Bill Davidow wrote a 730-
word missive for the Atlantic entitled, The Tragedy of the Internet Commons.41 In it, he 
asserts the efficiency of free markets and the surety that commons open to free markets are 
necessarily doomed to destruction, attempting to envision what Hardin would think about 
the internet. Davidow initially traverses physical and cyberspace, hypothesizing that digital 
retailers siphon revenue from the physical “bricks-and-mortar commons.”42 His main 
point, however, centers on the issue of privacy, reiterating Hardin’s warning to make a 
point about the impossibility of self-regulation and the need for privacy laws in the United 
States to rival those in Europe. 
Countering Davidow’s arguments, Mark Raymond, writing in 2013 as a fellow at 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, penned Puncturing the Myth of the 
Internet as a Commons. In it, he posits that Davidow’s first point has more to do with 
normal business practices than destructive forces related to overuse of a commons. The 
point about privacy is considered moot because the mere existence of costs (as in time to 
filter spam) does not necessitate a commons situation. Raymond’s first point makes sense. 
It is strange indeed to compare the cannibalism of physical retail by online shops to be in 
any way related to even modern interpretations of the commons. That does not necessarily 
exclude it from the realm of possibility, but Davidow positions it as a function of the 
internet as a commons. Davidow would find more purchase analyzing the online retail 
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function itself as a kind of commons, relying on models such as Porter’s Five Forces to 
explain the effect of new entrants on a market. And even on that face, little purchase would 
the argument find, unless Davidow could demonstrate that too many entrants to the digital 
marketplace cause customer burnout, driving away online sales. Davidow’s privacy 
argument is much stronger than Raymond gives credit. For one, the argument is not 
primarily concerned with costs incurred as a result of spam. If privacy can be unitized, then 
it can be measured as a function of subtractability. That would at least make it more likely 
to be a matter of either private property or common pool resources. From there, and well 
beyond the scope of this paper, one would have to determine how excludability works to 
increase and decrease privacy. If one feels their privacy is decreased by some online 
activity, does self-exclusion increase privacy? What are the systemic effects of data-as-a-
service (DaaS) companies on the ability for one to manage his or her privacy? These are 
questions worth investigating and Davidow is clearly attempting to start the conversation 
(or at least he was in 2012). The most egregious error in Davidow’s piece is the complete 
disregard of 40 years of research since Hardin’s Tragedy. 
Raymond’s Puncturing the Myth quickly moves past Davidow, contending 
primarily that while a commons must exhibit rivalry (i.e. zero-sum subtractability) and 
excludability, the internet does neither.43 Raymond wisely borrows from thoughts 
expressed by both Hardin and Ostrom about pollution, presenting the example of 
congestion as one way that the internet could theoretically become rivalrous. However, he 
offers that a simple solution may be found in building out infrastructure and generally 
improving technology. He goes on to point to several ways in which internet participants 
may be excluded from use, including the example of the so-called “Great Firewall of 
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China” and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Curiously, some of Raymond’s 
arguments suit their own needs as they arise. For instance, if the solution to congestion is 
to simply “build more physical infrastructure,”44 yet participants may be easily excluded 
from the internet through the destruction of infrastructure (as Raymond asserts45), then 
every situation has a solution and the problem loses its bounds. One arguing for thinking 
of the internet as a commons would be burning infrastructure to create rivalry while 
building it for non-excludability. One arguing against thinking about the internet as a 
commons would be building infrastructure for non-rivalry and burning it to keep people 
out. The phrase self-licking ice cream cone finally makes sense. 
Raymond’s contrarianism might be too quick to make a point where better framing 
of the issue would have improved its fidelity. His argument is correct in its focus on the 
language of commons analysis, where rivalry is a function of subtractability, positioned 
orthogonally to excludability. However, his ultimate assessment that the internet is more 
akin to a set of nested clubs is unnecessarily limiting. Certainly, in some aspects, the 
internet may exhibit qualities of clubs, and those clubs may well be nested. But as desirable 
as an elegant nomenclature may be, it does not accurately capture the polycentric 
independence of various exchanges having to do with cyberspace. The internet is a massive 
and unique combination of physical infrastructure, digital transmissions, personas, and 
abstract concepts. Analyzing it as a monolithic set in any regard is unproductive and leads, 
as Raymond’s paper demonstrates, to recursive exceptionalism; hemming and hawing. The 
overwhelming majority of commons research does not examine all arable land as a 
commons but narrows its focus to a specific plot of land for which subtractability tends to 
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be high and excludability low. In fact, it was Hardin who attempted to solve for the entirety 
of the biosphere as a commons and it led to an appeal for forced sterilization. 
The task, then, is not to answer if cyberspace is a commons, but to posit when and 
where cyberspace exhibits elements of a commons, given a particular context. When 
framing the internet as a domain of warfare, one focal area fits the definition of a commons 
exceedingly well: internet-connected industrial control systems (ICS). These systems are 
used around the world to automate processes in large-scale utilities, manufacturing 
facilities, oil & gas operations, and infrastructure controls; not to mention localized 
deployment in commercial transportation vehicles such as ships and airplanes. In a sense, 
the growing adoption of ICS, is creating a commons for nation-states to exploit. This results 
in a situation where any nation-state may endeavor to attack any ICS (low excludability) 
and the successful exploitation of an ICS results in at least the exploit (in a technical sense), 
but potentially the entire system, being made unavailable to other nation-states (high 
subtractability), most importantly the host nation. In other words, the proliferation of 
internet-connected ICS may be “stocking the pond” for cyber warfare. 
Another example of a commons situation specific to cyberspace and cyber warfare 
is in the development and use of zero-day vulnerabilities (0-days). The U.S. National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines a zero-day attack as one that 
“exploits a previously unknown hardware, firmware, or software vulnerability.” Major 
attacks like Stuxnet can take advantage of numerous zero-days at once, showing a 
propensity for some to stockpile and chain 0-days for complex operations. Of course, 
software vulnerabilities tend to be a rule of coding rather than an exception, and developers 
are regularly issuing patches so that users are guarded against flaws and exploits. However, 
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there are situations when an attacker is able to find a vulnerability and maintain its secrecy 
long enough to develop an exploit, deliver a payload, and compromise a system. Here, only 
upon discovery of some intrusion can a developer eventually determine that there is a 
vulnerability and issue an appropriate fix. The ubiquity of software makes it virtually 
impossible to exclude anyone from analyzing code for vulnerabilities, and the limited-use 
nature of 0-days gives them the quality of high subtractability. The global availability yet 
extremely limited use of 0-days makes them one of the truly novel issues related to cyber 
warfare. Imagine 20 ships enter a fishery and all 20 ships catch a single fish. They are all 
able to view and touch and smell the fish on their own ships. The following day, 19 ships 
come to find that their fish have rotted because the captain of the 20th ship had a nice, big 
dinner. Also, the power is now out in Ukraine. Such is the new commons of cyberspace 
and cyber warfare. 
The point of introducing these examples is not to narrowly define a perspective that 
will necessarily carry across each of the governance models under review — though it is 
presented because it closely aligns with problems of physical aggression that concern those 
discussing cyber warfare. Rather, it is to demonstrate how problems related to the internet 
and cyber warfare can and do take on characteristics such that individual situations can 
reasonably be considered common pool resources. This lays an important foundation, 
providing specific reasoning for selection of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework. It is difficult to overstate the high degrees of complexity, variability, and 
subjectivity in interpreting cyber warfare as a problem of the commons. Yet, hopefully the 
explanations of the strategic and economic implications of ICS and 0-days removes any 
doubt that it is feasible. Recall Raymond’s allusion to the congestion problem. This is an 
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often-overlooked converse perspective on the commons that strengthens the case for cyber 
warfare as a common pool resource issue. It was Hardin who said in Tragedy, “…the air 
and waters surrounding us cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons 
as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that 
make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them untreated.46 
In international relations terms, this means that in order to prevent that most pollutinous 
practice of warfare, nation-states must find it less costly to resolve political matters 
diplomatically than to conduct violent cyberattacks. 
There are three key takeaways from the preceding sections. First is that cyber 
warfare is worth analyzing and discussing, if not for that most important endeavor of 
preserving peace and human life, then because so much remains unknown even as some 
are attempting to establish norms and governance regimes for its proper management. 
Second is that certain aspects of cyberspace do comport with traditional notions of the 
commons and an especially relevant concept is that of subtraction by addition or pollution. 
Third is that the field of economics and especially the discipline concerning analysis of 
common pool resource management has a framework capable of analyzing the likely 













 The primary objective of this research is to assess the likely effectiveness of two 
of the most prominent cyber warfare governance models in existence today: the Tallinn 
Manual and the Digital Geneva Convention. While each model will be assessed against 
self-stated or implied objectives, the overarching question remains one of how best to 
inculcate global norms of cyber warfare in order to maximize the security of 
noncombatants by minimizing physical injury to them. 
 One of the most brilliant aspects of Ostrom’s work in developing the IAD is in 
her commitment to ensuring its broad and successful application. In addition to the 
establishment of the Ostrom Workshop at the University of Indiana and continuing 
rigorous field work throughout her life, she provided an instruction manual for how to set 
up a study using the IAD framework. This paper therefore adheres to this guidance, 
which is published as An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design by 
Margaret M. Polski and Elinor Ostrom.47 
 
The research design follows seven steps:48 
1. Define the policy analysis objective and specify the analytic approach 
2. Analyze physical and material conditions 
3. Analyze community attributes 
4. Analyze rules 
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5. Integrate the analysis (in process with both Tallinn Manual and DGC) 
6. Analyze patterns of interaction 
7. Analyze outcomes 
 Each model will be independently fit to the IAD framework as shown in Figure 2 
using explicit elements from proponent discourse and implicit derivations from public 
exposition. To the greatest extent possible, questions posed in each step of the research 
design will be controlled so that analysis remains model independent. However, this is 
not a comparative study and the differing nature of the models may necessitate some 
variance in the lines of questioning. 
Definitions 
 First and foremost, a few words on words. Arguably, the most important 
definition related to this research is that which forms an understanding of the term cyber 
warfare. Whereas definitions for framing the models in question are taken from existing 
IAD literature and specific technical definitions are taken from the models themselves, 
the notion of a cyberattack in the context of cyber warfare must be dealt with here and 
now. Since the DGC offers no explicit commentary on the matter and the Tallinn Manual 
devotes nearly six pages to the topic, the following definition applies to references made 
by both models: 
 Cyberattack (also, cyber attack) — As defined by Rule 92 in the Tallinn Manual 
2.0, a [cyberattack] is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is 




 Since there is little in the way of official definitions of cyber warfare, this 
research refers to such conduct as that in which one nation-state actively employs one or 
more cyberattacks against another nation-state in pursuit of political objectives. 
 
 The following definitions serve three purposes. The first is to clearly define each 
variable found within the IAD in order to establish the nodes for logically mapping 
attributes of each individual model. The second is to provide a greater sense of context 
around the variability across each variable. The third is to highlight how each variation of 
individual variables will be handled for the purposes of this research. In order to maintain 
consistency with existing literature, other than a few exceptions, the definitions below are 
generally attributable to the same source, viz. MD McGinnis’s An Introduction to IAD 
and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework.50 
 
 Framework — Identifies, categorizes, and organizes those factors deemed most 
relevant to understanding some phenomenon. 51 
 
 Theory — Posits general causal relationships among some subsets of these 
variables or categories of factors, designating some types of factors as especially 
important and others as less critical for explanatory purposes. 52 
 
 Model — Specifies the specific functional relationships among particular 




 Institutions — The set of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible 
to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation 
rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not 
be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.54 
 
 The Tallinn Manual and the DGC are best understood as models of institutions. 
Those institutions may be customary international law, the Geneva Conventions, 
governance scholarship, etc. It would be premature to say that either model is yet accepted 
as a set of working rules for the absent conduct of cyber warfare. 
 
 Polycentricity — a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping 
jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which 
these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are 
authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes. 55 
 
 Exogenous Variables — Designates variables that appear in an 
economic/econometric model but are not explained by that model (i.e. they are taken as 
given by the model).56 
 
 Biophysical/Material Conditions — The biophysical or material conditions 
denoted in each model describe the nature of the good or physical/material conditions. 
There are two defining characteristics of goods and services: Subtractability (i.e. Does 
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A’s consumption of a resource lower B’s potential enjoyment thereof?) and Excludability 
(i.e. How costly is it for A to exclude B from the resource?). These characteristics are 
typically viewed orthogonally to one another with subset measurements of high and low. 
Based on the degree of highness or lowness, entities can be categorized thusly: 
 
• Low Subtractability and High Excludability: Public Goods 
• Low Subtractability and Low Excludability: Toll or Club Goods 
• High Subtractability and High Excludability: Private Goods  
• High Subtractability and Low Excludability: Common Pool Resources 
 
 For each of the models, the Biophysical/Material Conditions are such that the 
governance of cyber warfare includes the conduct of cyber warfare, where high 
subtractability is evident in three key areas: physical harm to noncombatants, destruction 
of physical systems, and global security in general. And excludability is low given the 
hyperconnected nature of the internet, amplified by problems associated with attribution 
and non-repudiation. The exogenous nature of human life, ICS, and security become 
endogenous when analyzed in the context of the Action Arena.  
 
 Attributes of Community: This is a summary term used to designate all relevant 
aspects of the social and cultural context within which an action situation is located. Key 
themes are trust, reciprocity, common understanding, and social capital. 57 
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 Because neither the “community” nor the “attributes” thereof are explicitly 
defined by either model, in order to normalize analysis, this research introduces a novel 
and modified interpretation of the Clausewitzian Trinity58, hereafter referred to as Figure 
3. This modern take on an easily recognizable model serves to marry the disciplines of 
military strategy and economics while providing a quick reference for thinking about 




 Rules - Rules that specify the values of the working components of an action 
situation. While McGinnis presents seven distinct kinds of rules, this research does not 
specifically address each in kind. Rather, it seeks to identify rules of each institution and 
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rules that come as a result of the creation of those institutions. In other words, rules for 
development process may be as or more important (in this anticipatory state) than rules-
in-use.59 
 
 Action Situations – This is the core component of the IAD Framework, in which 
individuals (acting on their own or as agents of organizations) observe information, select 
actions, engage in patterns of interaction, and realize outcomes from their interaction. 60 
 
 The Action Arena - The action situation is the “black box” where operational, 
collective, or constitutional choices are made. 61 
 
 Participants – Includes the parties acting upon and constrained by the elements 
of excludability and subtractability. 62 
 
 Interactions and Outcomes - Denotes the pattern of interactions among resource 
users and the particular resources upon which their livelihood relies; both the social and 
the ecological components of this focal action situation can be decomposed into smaller 
components as well as situated within the context of broader aggregations.  
 
 Evaluative Criteria - Evaluative Criteria may be used by participants or external 
observers to determine which aspects of the observed outcomes are deemed satisfactory 
and which aspects are in need of improvement. 63 Each criterion will include an 
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assessment of high (green), medium (yellow), low (orange-red), or NA (white), along 
with a brief rationale. The following chart provides an example: 
Evaluative Criteria Sample Ratings (Low, Medium, High) 
Efficiency in use of resources, 
especially capture of economies 
of scale 
High – Proven viable at multiple levels 
Equity in distributional 
outcomes and processes 
High – Maximizes utility of all stakeholders 
Legitimacy as seen by 
participants in decision 
processes 
Medium – National but not international 
recognition 
Accountability, especially to 
direct users of resource 
Medium – Rules in place but little enforcement 
Fiscal equivalence:  the extent 
to which the beneficiaries of a 
public good or service are 
expected to contribute towards 
its production 
Low – Undue fiscal strain on unrelated parties 
Consistency with the moral 
values prevalent in that 
community 
Low – Values are at odds with affected 
community 
Robustness or resiliency NA – Not enough data to evaluate 
 
Limitations 
 This research is subject at least to the following limitations, biases, and 
assumptions: 
• Faulty premise - This research assumes that cyber warfare is a possibility. If 
Johns Hopkins Professor Thomas Rid is correct, then Cyber War Will Not Take 
Place.64 Dr. Rid is not alone in his assertion, buffeted by Gartzke’s The Myth of 
Cyberwar.65 If this is the case, then developing rules to prevent cyber war would 
be a waste of time and this analysis would be an even greater waste of time. 
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• Many rivers to the sea - The Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
is not a guarantor of success any more than a historically successful business 
model or war strategy is a guarantor of success. Instead, it is to be understood as a 
guide for delineating the various parts of systems that tend to fall into particular 
categories, enabling some degree of rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, there are 
bound to be those who misinterpret the evaluation as in some way definitive. The 
best that this research can ever do is to gently guide the conversation. 
• The recursive prison of polycentricity – Drawing conclusions about 
interconnected social systems necessarily calls for a kind of hypervariate analysis 
that could go on without terminus. Where termini exist in this research, they have 
been placed either by the analyst or that most joyous constraint of time. 
• No one asked for this - Neither the Tallinn Manual nor the Digital Geneva 
Convention makes any reference to development using the IAD framework as a 
guide. Therefore, fitting these governance frameworks to the IAD is necessarily 
deductive and will require some degree of subjective assessment and good 
judgment. That judgment is and ought to be open to interpretation, and the 
research welcomes disconfirmation. 
• Post hoc cum/ergo propter hoc – So long as nation-state behavior aligns with 
explicit norms, it can be difficult to disprove success of those norms. Dangers of 
correlation, causation, etc. This does not necessarily mean that the norms earn the 
benefit of the doubt, but it does call for additional theorizing about the causes of 
peace when war is an option. 
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• High degree of subjectivity – The IAD requires some degree of artistry in 
application. That, combined with the complexity of global governance issues and 
the uncertain of what the future will bring, increase the chance of bias affecting 





















GOVERNANCE AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN CYBERSPACE 
 One of the major areas of study within New Institutional Economics is the 
interplay between institutions (formal and informal rules) and the individuals, 
organizations, and interactions that they govern. A key takeaway from Ostrom’s research 
is that commons can be effectively governed while maintaining the attributes that make 
them a commons in the first place. She uses the entirety of the third chapter of Governing 
the Commons to demonstrate situations of successful and sustainable self-governance. 
This is encouraging for local problems as those principles of success may be applicable 
on a global scale. This section provides a brief overview of the concept of governance as 
understood within the discipline of international relations. Though, the interdisciplinary 
leap isn’t as great as it may at first appear. There are important points from IR 
scholarship that are useful for thinking about applying Ostrom’s local economic success 
stories to interactions between nation-states, including the conduct of war. 
 Global governance can be defined as “the collective effort to identify, understand, 
and address worldwide problems that are beyond the capacity of individual states.”66 
Perhaps one of the best examples of polycentricity as it relates to governance is found in 
the introduction to Ann-Marie Slaughter’s A New World Order. There, she describes an 
ideal in which global governments would be interconnected in a latticework that would 
look like the globe atop Lee Lawrie’s Atlas sculpture in Rockefeller Center. She 
describes this as a “world of government networks” with the promise of greater 
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effectiveness and justice than “a set of global institutions perched above nation-states 
enforc[ing] global rules.”67 It can be easy to think of governance purely as a function of 
the state; however, states are not alone in the development, proliferation, or even 
enforcement of governance mechanisms.68 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
think tanks, academic institutions, corporations, and individuals are all potential 
participants. Citing Martin Shapiro, Slaughter discusses the presumptive duty of private 
actors in upholding the public trust as new members of global policymaking. Shapiro 
himself states that moving from government to governance can erode boundaries between 
what is in and outside of government.69 
 Consider the deployment of far-reaching standards such as the fifth generation of 
wireless technology. Deployment of 5G networks has necessarily been a joint effort 
between corporations responding to consumer demands, governments responding to the 
desires of their constituents (along with the promise of increased soft power), and 
international alliances that manage the use of 5G networks across borders to comport 
with differing legal requirements. The case of Huawei and Euro-American adoption of 
5G is instructive as to how even low-level international conflict can influence governance 
decisions and project onto private industry the politics of the state. 
   
The Evolution of Governance in Cyberspace 
 The purpose of this section is to provide a brief review of how governance has 
evolved in cyberspace, from notional circumstances supported by concerns over U.S. 
national security to an international, polycentric practice covering topics ranging from 
physical hardware to intellectual property theft. Interestingly, the current focus on cyber 
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warfare brings governance full circle, even as it has expanded in scope. Technological 
advancement pairs neatly with matters of global governance. There is perhaps no better 
example of this than the internet. What began under the auspices of the United States 
Department of Defense through its Advanced Research Projects Agency and relying upon 
connections between the University of California, Los Angeles and the non-profit 
Scientific Research Institute (SRI) International, now connects tens of billions of devices 
in every country on earth.  
 Initially, governing the internet was a largely technical matter, the responsibility 
for which lay with its creators and early adopters in government and academia. True 
codification of standards began in 1986 with the forming of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), followed in 1988 by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA), and most prominently in 1998 by the Internet Corporation for the Assignment of 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). On the last point, former U.S national security official 
Richard Clarke has shared his skepticism that, “ICANN demonstrates [a] vulnerability of 
the Internet, which is governance, or the lack thereof. No one is really in charge.”70 Yet 
even ICANN boasts four advisory committees, including internet users and governments. 
All of these organizations have focused on establishing technical norms to increase 
international adoption. They were not, however, built to address rising issues of nefarious 
use of the internet. The vast majority of governance in cyberspace has thus far been 
legislative. 
 The earliest attempts to govern the use computer systems predate even webpages. 
In the United States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA) classified for 
the first time computer crime as separate and distinct from mail and wire fraud. The 
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nuanced nature of and capabilities afforded by interconnected computers required new 
and specific kinds of regulation. It is nevertheless important to remember that the CFAA 
arose not out of an immediate need to address any particular problem, but in reaction to a 
Hollywood film. Fred Kaplan opens his book Dark Territory with the story of how, in 
1984, President Reagan was compelled by the movie WarGames to ask about information 
systems and associated threats to national security. Understandably, the president was 
concerned that a hacker could launch an ICBM with the stroke of a key. Then-Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, reported back to the president that the 
“problem is much worse than you think.”71 Soon thereafter, on September 17, 1984, the 
Reagan Administration published the National Policy on Telecommunications and 
Automated Information Systems Security or National Security Decision Directive 
Number 145 (NSDD-145). The document laid the foundation for what would become the 
CFAA. Since the time it was signed into law, the CFAA has been amended no fewer than 
nine times to extend its reach. New provisions have included extended protection for the 
financial sector, elimination of the need for intent in the use of classified information, 
new definitions of “damage,” increased penalties for state computer crimes, expanded 
protection to “extraterritorial” computer systems, and even broader coverage in the 
private sector, among others.72 
 Over the same time period, other nations have sought to enact similar laws 
governing the use of computers and access of systems via the internet. The United 
Kingdom passed the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, which, like the CFAA, is regularly 
amended. Singapore has its own Computer Misuse Act, first passed in 1993. In 1997, 
China enacted the Computer Information Network and Internet Security Protection and 
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Management Regulations. And in 2007, the Council of Europe (CoE) hosted the 
Budapest Convention, which produced the first international treaty to bring concordance 
to the many individual national laws that had emerged over the interceding decades. The 
treaty was successful not only in its acceptance and ratification by European Council 
members (inclusive of many nations not otherwise members of the European Union), but 
also by prominent non-CoE states such as Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, and the 
United States. These individual and collective efforts have made abstract concepts like 
cybercrime more tangible in the minds of political leaders, law enforcement officials, and 
individuals alike. However, an unintended consequence has been the implicit and 
deepening commingling of cybercrime with broader national defense and acts of war. 
 Use of the CFAA to prosecute both civilians committing petty crime and 
representatives of nation states attempting to breach government networks illustrates a 
kind of legal scope creep that opens wide the interpretation for oft-misunderstood actions. 
One of the most infamous and controversial cases involving the CFAA was the 2011 
prosecution of Aaron Swartz, a software developer and co-founder of the popular news 
and culture website Reddit. That year, Swartz was caught downloading academic articles 
using the network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Prosecutors 
assumed that his intention was to distribute the articles for free via peer-to-peer networks. 
Swartz was charged with 11 violations of the CFAA, which carried possible penalties of 
up to $1 million and 35 years in federal prison. Two days after being denied a plea 
bargain in the case, Swartz hanged himself.73 
 Many have cited the theft of intellectual property (IP) as a threat to national 
security.74 In a 2019 guest post for the Council on Foreign Relations, Erica Borghard of 
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West Point and Shawn Lonergan of consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers described 
how the United States had recently begun offensive cyber operations designed to steal 
Chinese IP in retaliation for Chinese groups allegedly stealing American IP, especially 
that which could impact national security.75 Borghard and Lonergan specifically cite 
indictments issued in 2018 by the United States government concerning the theft of 
information related to proprietary technology from various private firms as well as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL).76 Many of the statutes cited in the indictment relate to Chapter 18, 
Section 1030 of U.S. Code, the CFAA. Not only did the indictments against the suspected 
Chinese hackers include language like “victim,” “advanced persistent threat,” and 
“overcoming network defenses,” the U.S. Department of Justice published a press release 
in December 2018 emphasizing the national security implications of the alleged Chinese 
hackers.77 At the time, then-director of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, 
Dermot F. O’Reilly said, “The theft of sensitive defense technology and cyber intrusions 
are major national security concerns and top investigative priorities for the DCIS. 
 In the case of Aaron Swartz, no such parallels were or have since been officially 
drawn to the need for preventing his alleged behavior in order to preserve national 
security. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that although the CFAA may have 
originated out of concerns for national security, it has come to serve a dual purpose (or 
more accurately taken on a superseding purpose) in settling more routine criminal and 
civil matters. None of this is to say that the concept of national security pertains only to 
the prevention of physical attack by foreign adversaries. In fact, there exists a continuum 
by which one nation may seek to conduct espionage and escalate to more overt criminal 
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acts to test defenses for the sake of staging an attack. However, nations must be 
especially watchful when dealing with information technology and security as it tends to 
compound abstract concepts. When it comes to speculation about the blurring of these 
lines, some scholars point to more perverse motivations. Political scientist and IP scholar 
Debora Halbert has written that, “the focus on the theft of intellectual property as a 
security issue helps justify enhanced surveillance and control over the Internet and its 
future development.”78 
 This is a critical point and one which speaks directly to aspiring governors of 
cyber warfare. There is a great paradox in the juxtaposition between problem 
identification and solutioning. That is, that one may develop an idea of some potential 
problem and draw logical conclusions to its eventuality. However, the time between 
problem identification and the testing of a solution in real-time can be vast. Without 
periodic application of the proposed problem-solving mechanisms, there exists a practical 
vacuum that governors tend to fill with analogous application. The problem then is that 
these interim applications result in their own effects and their immediacy necessitates 
change moment to moment, all while the spectre of the original problem is yet to be seen 
in action. By responding to these moment-to-moment needs, the tendency to stray from 
original aim increases, as the farther a bullet travels from the muzzle of a rifle, the more 
chance it will be impacted by physical forces and the surrounding environment to be 
knocked off course. The paradox itself is that the interim actions serve to justify 
functionally and economically the continuance of wayward travel and barring some 
Socratic effort, one with potentially infinite downside, there is no mechanism for keeping 
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a movement on its trajectory. The following section illuminates this paradoxical gap by 
condensing more than 30 years of cyber warfare into a few vignettes. 
 
The Aeonian Dawn of Cyber-physical Attacks 
 To date, the number of cyberattacks known to have caused physical damage 
remains at one.79 The attack in question was discovered in 2010 by Belarusian malware 
analyst Sergey Ulasen.80 At the time, Ulasen had a customer in Iran reporting that 
computers running Microsoft Windows were unexpectedly rebooting and producing what 
is known as the “blue screen of death,” a situation in which a computer freezes, showing 
only a bright blue background on the screen. The code causing the problems came to be 
known as Stuxnet and it would forever change how nations and individuals viewed the 
cyber-physical divide. In a 2011 interview, Ulasen noted, “the complexity of Stuxnet’s 
code...led us to conclude that this malware was a fearsome beast with nothing else like it 
in the world.”81 Cybersecurity reporter Kim Zetter describes the attack in her 
groundbreaking investigation Countdown to Zero Day, which not only walks through the 
complexities of the malware in question, but also lays out a strong case for who was 
behind the attack amid one of the most perennially challenging issues in cybersecurity: 
attribution. 
 As no one has yet taken responsibility for Stuxnet, the public has had to rely on 
technical and investigative reporting to understand what happened, who did it, and why. 
It is now generally believed that the covert Operation Olympic Games began in 2006 
under U.S. President George W. Bush. This was in response to reports that the Iranian 
government was planning to resume uranium enrichment at its facility in Natanz. What 
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allegedly ensued was a top-secret multi-year campaign orchestrated by United States and 
Israeli intelligence services to infiltrate Iranian networks at Natanz and hijack automation 
systems to damage centrifuges used in the enrichment process. Over the course of many 
months, Stuxnet caused intermittent changes in the rotational velocity of the centrifuges 
until they broke. Because of certain nuances built into the malware to obscure its 
presence and actions, Iranian scientists grew increasingly confused about otherwise 
inexplicable operations, purportedly leading to internal turmoil and further disruption.82 
 There is a broad range of opinion on the effectiveness of Stuxnet, given the 
implied goal of degrading Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium. Stuxnet reportedly 
damaged about 980 centrifuges (at the time, one-fifth of the total) at the facility in 
Natanz.83 A widely promoted estimation puts the amount of time that Iran’s nuclear 
program was set back at two years; others put the time closer to a few months.8485 In what 
may be the best indicator of the operation’s long-term effectiveness, a 2011 report by the 
IAEA states, “[the] rate of production of 3.5% enriched uranium at Natanz has dipped 
slightly, but continues to be among the fastest rates documented; [it] remains almost 
twice as fast as pre-Stuxnet (2009-2010).”86 
 David Sanger was one of the first journalists to tell the story of Stuxnet and 
although the world hasn’t seen anything like it since it did its damage in Iran, Sanger 
chronicled recent attempts by the U.S. to cause physical damage by cyber means in a 
series of 2017 articles, culminating in his 2018 book The Perfect Weapon. Mr. Sanger 
details evidence that the United States government has shown interest in a “left of 
launch” strategy for stopping missile testing by the North Korean regime, including a 
detailed plan that was presented by Raytheon at the 2015 Space and Missile Defense 
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Symposium. The plan in question goes so far as to promise cyber means of “sabotaging 
[missiles] on the factory floor.”87 According to Sanger, “the idea is to strike an enemy 
missile before liftoff or during the first seconds of flight.”88 However, no definitive link 
has been made between the “left of launch” initiative and North Korea’s failed missile 
tests. 
 There is another story worth mentioning if only to put to rest claims that using 
software to effect physical destruction long predates Stuxnet. Several prominent books 
engaging in purported histories of cyber war include references to what may have been 
the 1982 explosion of the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk gas pipeline near Tobolsk, 
USSR. The story originally appeared in former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas 
Reed’s 2004 memoir At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War. In it, Reed tells 
a second-hand story from Gus Weiss, a National Security Council member under 
President Ronald Reagan. As the story goes, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
infected computer chips with a “trojan horse” computer program designed to cause 
automation systems to malfunction. The malicious software “worked,” supposedly 
causing pressure to build up in a portion of the pipeline, resulting in an explosion 
estimated to have been on the order of three kilotons. For reference, that force would 
have been equivalent to the 1917 Halifax Explosion in Canada, which leveled the entire 
village of Richmond, killing 2,000, or nearly a fifth of the explosive power of the atomic 
bomb “Little Boy,” which in 1945 the United States detonated over Hiroshima, Japan, 
killing as many as 150,000.89 
 The story was met with outright denial by former Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB) head of the Tyumen region Vasily Pchelintsev.90 Not to be confined 
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to Russian sources, Zetter allows for the story’s “apocryphal” status. Thomas Rid lays out 
a convincing criticism of the alleged plot in Cyber War Will Not Take Place. In 15 years, 
Reed’s tale has yet to be corroborated by any officials or people familiar with the matter 
(Rid notes this to be especially damning for the story’s veracity given declassification of 
supposedly related documents such as the Farewell Dossier, which described Western 
espionage on Soviet technology). Reed himself, in a 2010 interview with Zetter, left open 
the possibility that he was misremembering the situation, acknowledging “I don’t know if 
it really happened.”91 Now, that’s non-repudiation. Such widespread detraction has not 
stopped others from retelling the story as a matter of fact. Notably, Richard Clarke 
mentions the incident in passing as a matter of fact in his book Cyber War, with no 
sourcing whatsoever.92 Thomas Aquinas offers a charitable interpretation of the 
motivations behind this kind of storytelling: “Because philosophy arises from awe, a 
philosopher is bound in his way to be a lover of myths and poetic fables.”93 
 The truth is that imagination has both established and thus far ruled the cyber 
arena insofar as it may be considered a new domain of warfare. In many ways, cyber war 
appears to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, foretold since the days of dial-up and consistently 
reinforced over the years with increasingly urgent promises of devastation: 
preconceivedly infamous cyber Pearl Harbors and cyber 9/11s; matters of “when, not if” 
from the very leaders of agencies purportedly developing, unleashing, and at times losing 
track of antecedent and enabling mechanisms for those kinds of attacks. It was Admiral 
Michael Rogers, then director of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) who stated in March of 2016, “it is only a matter of 
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when, not if, you are going to see a nation-state, group, or actor engage in destructive 
behavior against critical infrastructure in the United States.”94  
 Five months after that speech, a group called the Shadow Brokers began releasing 
a virtual arsenal of exploits linked to the Equation Group and associated Tailored Access 
Operations (TAO) unit at the NSA. It turned out that the NSA had been developing and 
stockpiling 0-day vulnerabilities and corresponding exploits, most notably the 
EternalBlue exploit, which led to a serious of global cyber events. In May of 2017, 
WannaCry ransomware spread to computers around the world by way of EternalBlue. 
The cryptoworm disproportionately affected England’s National Health Service, locking 
systems and forcing the diversion of some patients from certain hospitals. The same 
exploit was used in the 2017 NotPetya ransomware, which brought several global 
businesses, most notably shipping company Maersk, to a standstill. If those warning the 
general public about the dangers of cyber-physical events are the same individuals 
leading organizations where code capable of causing them is developed and lost, then 
imagination is guaranteed to become reality. Who or what, then, can truly mitigate the 
risk of these types of situations? 
 
Enter the Governors of Cyber War 
The Tallinn Manual 
 On May 14, 2008, NATO established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia. The decision for its location was no 
coincidence. Beginning April 27, 2007, Estonia experienced a series of disruptive cyber 
events (commonly, if colloquially, “attacks”) consisting mainly of coordinated distributed 
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denial of service (DDoS) campaigns against popular email and banking websites. The 
campaigns persisted over the course of 22 days and resulted in “temporary degradation or 
loss of service on many commercial and government servers.”95 Many then (as now) 
suspected Russian involvement as a form of retaliation for Estonia’s moving of a Soviet-
era monument to a less public place. In 2008, CCD COE founder Dr. Rain Ottis 
published an analysis of the events concluding that “the event can be explained as a 
Russian information operation against Estonia.”96 Though, he was careful to add, “It 
should be noted that this analysis does not prove that there was an information operation 
due to lack of evidence from the Russian authorities.”97 Another testament to the 
challenge of attribution; in this case arousing suspicion by negation. 
 Months after the establishment of the CCD COE, the Centre contacted Michael N. 
Schmitt to request he speak at a conference. In his own words, Schmitt denied the 
invitation because, “at the time, lots of folks were focusing on cyber, but no one had 
answers.”98 He offered that if the Centre would put together a project to start answering 
the many questions that were out there, he would be willing to participate. It took only a 
few more months for the CCD COE to once again contact Schmitt, offering him “carte 
blanche” to start answering questions about cyber warfare.99 Soon thereafter, as director, 
Schmitt brought together the first International Group of experts to start a conversation 
around if, how, and when international law applies to issues of cyber warfare.100 
 Schmitt had been thinking and writing about cyber warfare long before Stuxnet 
was even a consideration. In 1999, he wrote an article entitled Computer Network Attack 
and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework. It was 
one of the earliest expositions on the implications that jus in bello would ostensibly have 
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on violent force delivered via the internet. In that paper, he lists as hypotheticals the 
derailment of trains and pirating of municipal traffic controls, among other scenarios. His 
initial assessment was that computer network attack is “war on the cheap” where barriers 
to entry are low and rewards are high. His conclusions began the mapping process of 
cyber events to implications within international law, specifically Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression). The same year that he published Computer Network Attack, Schmitt led a 
Naval War College Symposium to broaden the discussion (published in 2002 as 
Computer Network Attack and International Law in the Naval War College Journal of 
International Law Studies. Six years later, Schmitt would go on to become project 
director for the group that in 2013 and again in 2017 produced the Tallinn Manual 
(versions 1.0 and 2.0, respectively), a comprehensive, non-binding treatise on 
international law as it applies to cyber warfare (version 1.0) and other cyber operations 
(added in version 2.0). 
 It is important to note that the two versions of the manual are not merely the 
product of updating information. Rather, the first edition maintains a narrow focus on 
international law as it pertains to warfare (acts of aggression) and cyber analogs thereof, 
while the latter broadens the scope to include more general operations in cyberspace that 
do not necessarily reach the threshold of being considered acts of war. Boasting more 
than 100 military and legal expert participants and reviewers, the Tallinn Manual remains 
the most compendious effort to date to map, codify, and influence international legal 
norms related to jus ad bellum and jus in bello in cyberspace. Though it is worth noting 
 50 
that even in Tallinn 2.0, published a decade after the attacks on Estonia, Schmitt notes the 
lack of relevant treaties as well as “sparse” public availability of opinio juris.101 
 From the outset of developing the first Tallinn Manual and continuing through 
development of 2.0, Schmitt clearly identified the bounds of the problems at hand. 
Though the subject matter differs between versions, the principal question has aimed at 
reconciling existing international law with actions undertaken by nation-states in 
cyberspace. As Schmitt noted during the release event for 2.0, the process for discussing 
and attempting to reach consensus on these various topics has changed over time. The 
first Tallinn Manual relied on fewer than 50 individuals to make up the group consisting 
of the IGE, along with supporting legal researchers, and editors. Nearly all of these 
individuals represented either the United States or countries in Europe. 
 Tallinn Manual 2.0 more than doubled the size of the IGE and its supporting 
roles, and on top of refining its peer review process, instituted the so-called Hague 
Process. This was the result of the Dutch government approaching the IGE, asking how 
they could support the advancement of the group’s initial findings. The addition of the 
Hague Process was a response to increased attention from nation-states who, after largely 
sitting the sidelines for 1.0, showed much greater interest in being part of the process for 
2.0. The Asser Institute described the process thusly: ‘The Hague Process’ consists of 
over fifty States that attend at least one, sometimes more, of the three International 
Group of Experts meetings. In these meetings, States are provided with the draft texts and 
given the opportunity to express their views and comments on the content, an input which 
Prof. Schmitt described as extraordinarily useful.102 Or as Schmitt tells it: 
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“Nation-states originally kept us at arm’s length because we were going 
to seize the normative landscape from them. The second round, nation-
states came to them to ask how they could help. IGE committed to the 
principle that states and only states make international law. IGE listened 
to state legal advisor but reserved the right to tell states if their views were 
nonsense.”103 
 
 On February 8, 2017, the Atlantic Council hosted the launch of Tallinn Manual 
2.0. After a brief overview of how the manual came into being, Schmitt made a few brief 
remarks before stating with hints of relief and nostalgia, “we’re finished.” 
 
The Digital Geneva Convention 
 On a cyberdust covered content management platform tucked deep within the 
domain substructure of Microsoft Corporation lies a document that may be the first 
published reference to the technology giant’s call for a digital (or electronic) Geneva 
Convention. Written by Corporate Vice President Scott Charney (now vice president, 
security policy), Rethinking the Cyber Threat is a 14-page memo that outlines threats in 
four main categories: cyber crime [sic], military espionage, economic espionage, and 
cyber warfare. Commenting on the asymmetric advantages of cyberspace, Charney 
makes the claim that, “the internet permits a potentially anonymous and untraceable 
individual with virtually no resources to engage a nation-state in cyber warfare.”104 He 
goes on to invoke the idea of an “electronic Pearl Harbor” and theorizes that “perhaps 
part of the response is an electronic “Geneva Convention.” Charney ends his paper with a 
stepwise approach to governing cyber warfare: 
To address cyber warfare issues, countries must first develop domestic 
positions on what the rules for this new domain should be, taking due care 
to recognize the shared and integrated nature of the domain. Then there 
must be an international dialogue designed to create international norms 
 52 
for cyber space behavior. Creating these norms will be as difficult as it 
sounds, but it is still both necessary and, ultimately, unavoidable. Absent 
such an agreement, unilateral and potentially unprincipled actions will 
lead to consequences that will be unacceptable and regrettable.105 
 
 Like so many arks in so many crates, the subject of an electronic Geneva 
Convention was seemingly relegated to its own proverbial Hangar 51, though Microsoft 
would show renewed interest five years later. In November 2014, Charney published a 
follow-up entitled Governments and APTs: The Need for Norms (Rethinking the Cyber 
Threat #2). This document strays from the subject of warfare, mentioning it only five 
times in a 15-page document and focusing instead on matters of espionage; a hot topic 
given Edward Snowden’s revelations the year prior. Charney puts up the scaffolding for 
the DGC, calling for a “new framework,” presumably elucidated in the conclusory four 
stepwise points, viz.:106 
1. Countries with espionage programs must admit they target other governments 
2. Governments must discuss espionage programs that target private sector 
3. Governments must agree that the doctrine of proportionality applies to attacks on 
civilian products, services, and infrastructures 
4. Governments must accept that while private sector companies can be helpful, 
they cannot take sides in governmental disputes 
 
 By December 2014, things were really heating up towards a codification of what 
would become the Digital Geneva Convention. A team of 10 at Microsoft published the 
24-page International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing conflict in an Internet-dependent 
world. The introduction asserts that, “Cyber conflict and cyber war are not just theoretical 
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but are actual possibilities that need to be considered and addressed,” before 
acknowledging how nation-states are “operationalizing” cyberspace as a “domain for 
conflict.”107 The report presents the chart in Figure 4 as an explanation of various points 
at which an escalation in force by nation-states necessitates a particular kind of legal 





 In addition to pointing to LOAC as the ultimate legal arbiter of cyber warfare, 
International Cybersecurity Norms put forth the truest DGC prototype to date in the form 
of six mandates for nation-states:109 
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1. States should not target ICT companies to insert vulnerabilities (backdoors) or 
take actions that would otherwise undermine public trust in products and 
services. 
2. States should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and 
service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors 
rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them. 
3. States should exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and should ensure 
that any which are developed are limited, precise, and not reusable. 
4. States should commit to nonproliferation activities related to cyber weapons. 
5. States should limit their engagement in cyber offensive operations to avoid 
creating a mass event. 
6. States should assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and 
recover from events in cyberspace. 
 
 Microsoft’s penultimate policy paper in the evolution of the Digital Geneva 
Convention came in June 2016. Charney, leading a team of seven other Microsoft 
employees published Articulation to Implementation: Enabling progress on cybersecurity 
norms. Following the trend of previous publications, the topic of cyber warfare received 
almost no direct coverage. In fact, the only mention of the term warfare is in the only 
time any of Microsoft’s DGC-related blogs mentions the Tallinn Manual. The great irony 
is that the citation in question pulls from the Tallinn Manual to point to six governmental 
proposals that are “currently driving the global dialogue on cybersecurity norms.”110 
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 Suffice it to say that the Digital Geneva Convention was not quite the ex nihilo 
product it may have seemed in 2017. 
 
 On February 14, 2017, one week after the launch of Tallinn Manual 2.0, 
Microsoft President Brad Smith took to the mainstage at RSA Conference in San 
Francisco to deliver the conference’s keynote speech. Standing in front of a giant digital 
screen emblazoned with the Microsoft logo, he walked through indicators of growing 
threats to cyber security. He cited the fact that 74% of the world’s businesses were 
expecting to be “hacked” over the coming year; that total economic losses to cybercrime 
would reach $3 trillion by 2020; that, “We've seen cyberattacks move from enthusiasts to 
financial thieves to now governments around the world.”111 
 Smith further declared that, “cyberspace is the new battlefield,” echoing the 
sentiments of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III, who spoke about the topic 
seven years earlier at the same conference. It was Lynn who at the time said, “The 
government cannot protect our nation alone...It is going to take a public-private 
partnership to secure our networks." Where Lynn’s focus was on defense of national 
infrastructure, Smith presented his idea as a “call on the world's governments to come 
together.” In the spirit of the successful 1949 framework designed to protect civilians 
during times of war, Smith proposed a new “Digital” Geneva Convention to “protect 
civilians on the internet in times of peace.” 
 Smith laid out the details of the DGC as he saw it, stating, “the time has come to 
call on the world’s governments to come together, affirm international cybersecurity 
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norms that have emerged in recent years, adopt new and binding rules, and get to work 
implementing them.” The six “new and binding” rules he presented were: 
1. No targeting of tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure; 
2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from 
events; 
3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than to stockpile, sell, or exploit them; 
4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and ensure that any developed are 
limited, precise, and not reusable; 
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to cyberweapons; and 
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass event 
 
 The following section applies the information gathered for each of the 
aforementioned models to the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, then 


















Define the policy analysis objective and specify the analytic approach 
 The primary policy analysis objective for both the Tallinn Manual and the Digital 
Geneva Convention is to determine current and potential effectiveness of achieving self-
stated and otherwise implicit goals. A secondary analysis objective is to determine the 
likelihood of each model to prevent harm from befalling noncombatants in the event of 
cyber warfare. The analytic approach for both models and each objective is to define and 
map key model elements to Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework, following Polski and Ostrom’s guidance for applying the IAD to policy 





















The Tallinn Manual 
Mapping Model to Framework 
IAD Elements The Tallinn Manual 2.0 
Exogenous Variables  
Biophysical/Material 
Conditions 
Cyber-Physical Attacks as  
Common Pool Resource 
Attributes of Community 
People: Lawyers, policy scholars, noncombatants 
Nation-states: Legal advisors, military strategists 
Corporations: Legal counsel, fiduciary responsibility 
Rules 
Customary International Law 
The Law of Armed Conflict 
UN Charter 
Geneva Conventions 
Case Law (opinion juris) 
Findings of the UN GGE 
The Schmitt Process 
The Hague Process 
The Tallinn Manual 1.0 
Action Arena  
Action Situations 
Cyberspace as a battlefield 
e.g. Stuxnet (if nation-state) 
e.g. Cyberattacks on ICS 
Participants 
People: Nation-state duty to  
protect noncombatants 
Nation-states: Must adhere to international law 
Corporations: No hack back 
Interactions 
Nation-states determining strategy and policy 
Nation-states consulting international law 
Adoption of the Tallinn Manual 
Nation-states consulting the Tallinn Manual 
Nation-states engaging in cyber warfare 
Nation-states impacting civilian infrastructure 
Outcomes 
The IGE 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 
The Hague Process for legal issues in cyberspace 
International law applies in cyberspace 
International influence by participation 






Physical and material conditions 
 The Tallinn Manual recognizes the potential for nation-states to utilize cyber 
means to conduct warfare. This is explicitly defined as the use of cyber operations to 
inflict injury upon individuals or cause physical destruction in another state. The Tallinn 
Manual’s emphasis on nation-state responsibility initially points to material conditions at 
the public property level only. However, destruction must be viewed as a pollutive act, 
potentially leading to permanent loss, as in death. Whether analyzing the situation as a 
function of security, warfare, physical well-being, or utility garnered from public 
infrastructure, this results in a necessarily highly subtractive environment in which it is 
difficult to exclude participants (i.e. nation-states on the attack). 
 
Analyze community attributes 
 The genesis of the Tallinn Manual can be traced to 2009, when the NATO CCD 
COE agreed to sponsor the undertaking at the suggestion of Michael Schmitt. Schmitt 
then assembled the IGE based presumably on existing relationships, recommendations, 
and research based on scholarly contributions to date. The community, therefore, 
involves some degree of international institutionalism and civilian expertise, eventually 
incorporating broader individual expertise and nation-state input from top lawyers from 
more than 50 countries. The interactions between parties were organized around three 
sessions and an ongoing drafting and peer review process. Dialogue and pursuit of 
opinion from around the world captured one of the most vital aspects of sustainable 
common pool resource management: communication. It is worth noting that the IGE did 
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not include professionals from the cybersecurity industry (i.e. private sector). It is not 
entirely clear if that was intentional or, if so, why that was the case. 
 Only a small subset of the community under analysis is likely to be immediately 
impacted by the Tallinn Manual, viz. government legal advisors. Three years on from the 
release of the final version, the vast majority of references to the manual are in law 
journals and legal blogs. In order to become an effective institution, the Tallinn Manual 
will require advocates to ensure widespread adoption and opine periodically, in an 
official capacity, on real-world issues to which rules defined in the manual apply. The 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 analysis rests on the understanding that international law applies to 
cyber operations. This means that actions in cyberspace do not take place in a legal 
vacuum and states both have rights and bear obligations under international law. 
 Considering Figure 3, government lawyers will necessarily be responsible for 
educating and guiding political and military leaders on how international law applies to 
planned interstate action. Those leaders in turn must be willing to accept the findings of 
the Tallinn Manual or develop a system by which unresolved issues and concepts may be 
discussed. The Dutch government provided a method of bringing states together through 
what came to be known as the Hague Process. The community is decidedly public sector, 
(i.e. nation-states), with the possible addition of academics in general. 
 
Analyze rules 
 There are two sets of rules requiring analysis. The first set is in the development 
of the Tallinn Manual itself. The rules that governed establishment of the IGE, 
communication between members, the peer review process (collectively, the Schmitt 
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Process), and eventually the Hague Process proved successful in achieving consensus on 
many applications of international law. This set of rules and processes (the institution of 
the manual compared to the manual as an institution) proved successful and scalable as 
many of the processes for 1.0 were transferred and improved upon for 2.0. The success of 
1.0 in gaining the attention and desired participation of nation-states is another key 
indicator of its success. In that specific case, it demonstrates the IGE’s ability to garner 
deference, thereby achieving some measure of authority, reinforcing its governance 
capacity. 
 The second set of rules includes those published in the manual itself. Specific to 
the topic of international humanitarian law, Chapter 16 on The Law of Armed Conflict 
Generally (Rules 80-85), but the manual is virtually exhaustive in its coverage of 
international law topics. Constant care (Rule 114), protection of journalists (Rule 139), 
protection of children (Rule 138). protection of cultural property (Rule 142). The Tallinn 
Manual cites case law, legal conventions, international treaties, the Geneva Conventions, 
ICRC opinions, the UN charter, all in addition to providing commentary and differing 
viewpoints of the IGE.  
 The Tallinn Manual can become a true institution if it can be shown that its 
assertions are being accepted by nation-states. This association will grow stronger as 
those same nation-states find themselves in states of war. For now, the manual is the most 
thorough legal analysis on the subject of cyber warfare and both its rigorous process and 




Analyze patterns of interaction 
 The question remains how much influence the manual will have on nation-state 
decisions in the conduct of cyber warfare. Though, this analysis adjudges the Tallinn 
Manual to have a high potential effect on the actions of nation-states. This is because of 
the authority it garners by association with established and customary international law. 
Furthermore, its endogenous expert authority and ties to an international defense alliance 
in NATO all lend to strong governance potential. However, the same association could be 
more of a hindrance than a help if Russia views it as adversarial. Schmitt makes clear 
throughout the manual’s introduction that it is an independent work, but if Russia views it 
as an outgrowth of NATO attempts to balance regional power, then it could spell 
difficulty for true global adoption. 
 
Analyze outcomes 
 The Tallinn Manual’s book format makes it a portable and recognizable reference 
tool for state lawyers. During the launch event, Michael Schmitt claimed that Tallinn 
Manual 1.0 “probably sits in every [ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of defense] 
legal advisor’s office in the entire world, from Washington to Beijing.” If that is the case, 
then the same would reasonably be expected of Tallinn Manual 2.0. In fact, the Hague 
Process likely guarantees even broader nation-state adoption. After three years, the 
manual remains a relevant subject for legal research and analysis. Google Scholar shows 
1,120 references to the manual since 2019 alone. One of the central tenets of successful 
commons governance is the importance of communication. The fact that scholars around 
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the world continue to discuss the Tallinn Manual bodes well for its long-term acceptance 
and adherence, at least among legal scholars. 
 A true evaluation of the strength of the Tallinn Manual in guiding states can only 
take place if and when a nation conducts a cyberattack. Because of how interwoven the 
Tallinn Manual is with existing international law, the violation thereof would be a serious 
indictment about the preventive capabilities of law. The study is over. The book is 
written. As Schmitt noted at the same launch event, “We don’t make law, but 
[disagreeing is] going to be a tough sell for other states.” 
 
Evaluation 
 The Tallinn Manual achieves its stated aim of becoming a resource for state legal 
advisors in order for nation-state leaders to better understand how actions in cyberspace 
may be constrained by international law. The greatest question now relates to the degree 
to which international law itself prevents war. If international law in fact prevents warfare 
in any capacity, then the Tallinn Manual will be a successful model of governance for 
what may be termed notional or supra-arenas. The de facto nature of human reliance on 
law as promoter or dissuader of one action or another elevates the efficacy of the Tallinn 
Manual as a tool in the prevention of cyber warfare; certainly those most egregious 
violations of established international humanitarian law.  
 There do not appear to be any plans to continue to update the manual or hold 
additional meetings of the IGE. That leaves the door open for other institutions and 
organizations, including nation-states, to take the lead. The nation that sees Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 as a baton and takes it has the opportunity to control the conversation about 
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what constitutes legal and illegal action in cyberspace, especially during the prosecution 
of cyber warfare. Without an established governance regime to maintain the manual and 
continue to steward the conversation, there is some danger that what may currently be 
seen as a rulebook could morph into a playbook for nefarious state actors. 
 
Evaluation Table for the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
Evaluative Criteria Tallinn Manual Rating (Low, Medium, High) 
Efficiency in use of 
resources, especially 
capture of economies of 
scale 
High – Adherence to customary international law 
bakes in existing attempts to preserve many types of 
resources, including security and physical 
infrastructure as CPRs 
Equity in distributional 
outcomes and processes 
High – In theory, international law applies to all 
nations equally; institutional attempt to include 
scholars from around the world for input and 
presumably greater distribution of message 
Legitimacy as seen by 
participants in decision 
processes 
High – The Tallinn Manual rests on established 
international law and the Schmitt and Hague 
Processes ensured broad discussion and review of 
proposed rules; Implicit NATO association 
Accountability, especially 
to direct users of resource 
Medium – Makes case for compliance with law but 
reliant on existing enforcement mechanisms; 
compellence, deterrence, etc. 
Fiscal equivalence:  the 
extent to which the 
beneficiaries of a public 
good or service are expected 
to contribute towards its 
production 
NA – No calls for additional action aside from 
consideration by state legal advisors 
Consistency with the moral 
values prevalent in that 
community 
High – Comports with customary international law 
and took into account the many views of an 
international group of experts as well as >50 nation-
states 
Robustness or resiliency Medium – The Tallinn Manual is only as robust as 
international law. It lacks the support structure 







The Digital Geneva Convention 
Mapping Model to Framework 
IAD Elements The Digital Geneva Convention 
Exogenous Variables  
Biophysical/Material 
Conditions 
Cyber-Physical Attacks as  
Common Pool Resource 
Attributes of Community 
People: Policy scholars, Noncombatants 
Nation-states: Political and military leaders 
Corporations: Executives, employees 
Rules 
1. No targeting of tech companies, private 
sector, or critical infrastructure; 
2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, 
respond to, and recover from events; 
3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than 
to stockpile, sell, or exploit them; 
4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber 
weapons and ensure that any developed are 
limited, precise, and not reusable; 
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to 
cyberweapons; and 
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass 
event 
Action Situations  
The Action Arena Cyberspace as a battlefield 
Participants Tech sector (defense), Nation-states (offense) 
Interactions Public-private partnership 
Outcomes 
• Positive press reception 
• Friction with CCD COE 
• Cybersecurity Tech Accord 
• CyberPeace Institute 
• No binding international treaties 
• No nation-state attacks resulting in civilian 
harm (PHEPH) 
 
Analyze physical and material conditions 
 Literature and speeches concerning the proposed Digital Geneva Convention 
recognize the potential for nation-states to utilize cyber means to conduct warfare. This is 
implicitly understood as the use of cyber operations to inflict injury upon individuals or 
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to cause physical destruction in another state. The Digital Geneva Convention’s emphasis 
on a combination of nation-state and corporate responsibility blurs the line between 
public and private property. However, destruction must be viewed as a pollutive act, 
potentially leading to permanent loss, as in death. Whether analyzing the situation as a 
function of security, warfare, physical well-being, or utility garnered from public 
infrastructure, this results in a necessarily highly subtractive environment in which it is 
difficult to exclude participants 
 
Analyze community attributes 
 The Digital Geneva Convention began with a policy paper by Scott Charney, 
writing in his capacity as a vice president at Microsoft. Charney eventually assembled a 
small team of other Microsoft employees who continued to expound upon his ideas with 
their own. These small groups of about 10 employees periodically updated the policy 
papers and eventually the ideas became the Digital Geneva Convention, which Microsoft 
President Brad Smith presented to an audience of private sector technology firms at RSA 
Conference. Smith shared a similar presentation to the United Nations in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The majority of the affected community is the private sector; however, the 
aim of the DGC is to impact nation-states by brokering a binding international agreement. 
Thus far, there is little to support the idea that the DGC has had any impact at the nation-







 The Digital Geneva Convention consists of six rules. Since Brad Smith’s 
announcement in 2017, the rules have remained in their original state and may be 
reviewed on Microsoft’s On the Issues blog. As presented, the rules appear to put forth 
novel concepts with no reference to existing customs, laws, norms, or best practices. All 
six of the rules are intended for adherence by nation-states and Smith has stated on 
multiple occasions his goal of achieving an international binding treaty to solidify their 
institutionalization. Because they are limited in number, this analysis comments on each: 
 
1. No targeting of tech companies, private sector, or critical infrastructure 
 It is telling that the first item on the list is that nation-states should not target tech 
companies. The prime directive of international humanitarian law, upon which the 
Geneva Conventions are built, is the preservation of the lives of noncombatants. 
Nevertheless, rule one of the Digital Geneva Convention seems to be covered by 
international law concerning attacks on civilians and critical infrastructure, not to 
mention the fourth Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons. 
Though, critical definitions are missing from Microsoft’s proposed rule that would 
strengthen its legitimacy: 1. “targeting” and 2. bounds of a “tech company” and the 
“private sector.” Without these definitions, no further analysis can take place and the rule 
is determined to have low likely efficacy. 
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2. Assist private sector efforts to detect, contain, respond to, and recover from 
events 
 Here again, the ambiguity of the term “events” makes it impossible to analyze the 
intent of the rule. If the intent is that nation-states assist when private sector companies 
are the victims of cyberattacks (as defined in this paper), then that may fall within a 
certain duty of care. However, the threshold of compellence is not clear. The MITRE 
ATT&CK framework provides a popular visual representation of how cyberattacks can 
take place. It would be beneficial to map trigger points to some such framework. 
Otherwise, likely adoption of this rule and overall anticipated efficacy is low. 
 
3. Report vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than to stockpile, sell, or exploit 
them 
 This rule has some novelty in the era of cyber warfare and deserves additional 
input from the international legal community. The NSA leak and resulting nefarious use 
of the EternalBlue exploit demonstrates the dangers of harboring vulnerabilities and the 
means to exploit them. Nevertheless, this would place a new duty on nation-states and 
again the threshold for compellence is unclear. If nation-states are expected to report 
vulnerabilities to vendors, that implies that it is within their purview to seek out 
vulnerabilities in the first place. This may be a reasonable action as part of a risk 
management and supply chain vetting strategy, but it is unclear when and why nation-
states would conduct code analysis to the degree that they are finding software 
vulnerabilities. Likely adoption for this rule is moderate. 
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4. Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and ensure that any 
developed are limited, precise, and not reusable 
5. Commit to nonproliferation activities to cyberweapons 
6. Limit offensive operation to avoid a mass event 
 The final three rules require greater disambiguation prior to analysis. It is not 
clear how the restraint in developing cyber weapons does not satisfy the commitment to 
nonproliferation and how that in turn does not satisfy limiting offensive operations. If a 
nation-state satisfies rule four, then it follows that they would satisfy rules five and six. 
Regardless, the same problem threads the entire needle. That is, that without clear 
definitions and bounds, these rules have low overall likelihood of adoption and are 
therefore ineffective. Ironically, the similarity of the three rules does bode well for 
broader adoption if a nation-state agrees to any one of them. 
 
Integrate the analysis 
 The Digital Geneva Convention was conceived behind closed doors by a publicly 
traded, private sector technology company. In fact, it was precisely one individual who 
decided to write a paper and who summarily decided to update the same paper years later, 
leading to development of the DGC. While various Microsoft employees shared the 
vision along the way, there is no indication that any major international, interdisciplinary, 
or even intercorporate effort took place to fully assess even the need for a Digital Geneva 
Convention. Most baffling is that there are many recommendations for effective 
development of governance mechanisms in the literature.  As Avant and Martha 
Finnemore point out almost presciently: 
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“because of its role in the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions, for 
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross has a unique role 
to play in the development of international humanitarian law (Finnemore 
1996). NGOs attempting to develop a new understanding of the 
humanitarian effects of particular weapons, for example, are most likely to 
succeed if they first secure the endorsement of the ICRC Secretariat and 
persuade its representatives to speak out publicly on behalf of the issue.112 
 
If Microsoft has attracted the interest of the ICRC, then the two organizations are doing 
well to hide any endorsement. A search for the phrase “Digital Geneva Convention” on 
the ICRC website finds only two results, neither of which indicates any kind of 
partnership.  
 Furthermore, by the time Microsoft launched the DGC, the Tallinn Manual 1.0 
had been in publication for four years, yet Smith makes no mention of the manual in 
either San Francisco or Geneva. In fact, as of July 2020, the only reference to the word 
Tallinn on the Microsoft Blog is in a late 2017 piece by Brad Smith, a rather bad faith 
criticism stating, “While the Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE made important progress in some 
areas, they could not reach consensus on what the U.N. Charter has to say about losses 
of functionality in civilian infrastructure even when nothing gets physically broken.” The 
emphasis on the U.N. Charter strawmans the argument, avoiding the entirety of the 
Tallinn Manual’s work in mapping any and all relevant international law to matters in 
cyberspace. For the record, Rule 26 on Necessity is a good read. 
 The lack of attention paid to governance scholarship and existing international 
law, including, of all things, the Geneva Conventions, is baffling. A reasonable 
conclusion is that a large corporation saw an opportunity to seize on the brand 
recognition of a well-established international agreement and graft on a few quasi-novel, 
at times self-serving, rules, then present them without any external input or debate. If the 
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aim of the DGC is to establish a governance regime based on binding international 
agreements in order to protect civilians from the machinations of cyber warfare, then the 
initial effort leaves plenty to be desired. 
 
Analyze outcomes 
 The Digital Geneva Convention was initially well received. The UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) published an article opining on what the DGC would mean for the 
future of humanitarian action.113 The World Economic Forum bolstered support with a 
blog entitled ‘Why We Urgently Need a Digital Geneva Convention. And several 
technology trade publications, including WIRED magazine published extollations.114 
 Since then, Microsoft has sponsored several initiatives to promote the DGC, 
including the 2018 launch of a “Cybersecurity Tech Accord” (referred to aptly 
confusingly as a Digital Geneva Accord by the New York Times). As of July 2020, the 
Accord has nearly 150 tech company signatories. Those signatories agree to uphold four 
principles, including the protection of “our” users and customers everywhere, opposition 
of cyberattacks on “innocent” citizens and enterprises, empowerment of users to 
strengthen protection, and partnering with one another to strengthen cybersecurity. In 
June 2020, Accord signatory Facebook was alleged to have helped the FBI develop a 0-
day exploit for software not owned by Facebook in order to catch a child predator.115 
Facebook having reported the suspect to the FBI, determined that it could do more to help 
and hired a third-party firm to find a vulnerability in the operating system Tails (which 
none of the involved parties own). According to Facebook, the ends justified the means, 
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but the report highlights some of the very challenges that the DGC seeks to control, while 
amplifying its silence. 
 In September 2019, Microsoft announced the establishment of the CyberPeace 
Institute, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, asserting that, “The internet is the 
creation of the private sector, which is primarily responsible for its operation, evolution 
and security.”116 Microsoft has alluded to the need for an organization similar to the 
IAEA for monitoring cyber weapons. This appears to be one of the main functions of the 
CyberPeace Institute, which is currently in the process of hiring forensic investigators 
and data scientists, among other positions. It is most assuredly not merely a think tank, 
but a potential regulator and governor in its own right. While Brad Smith is a board 
member, the organization appears to aim at a more diverse approach than the Microsoft 
process that led to the DGC, boasting the likes of former President of Interpol Khoo Boon 
Hui and governance scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter. It is worth noting that Michael N. 
Schmitt sits on the advisory board for the CyberPeace Institute, which may indicate the 










Evaluation Table for the Digital Geneva Convention 
Evaluative Criteria DGC Rating (Low, Medium, High) 
Efficiency in use of 
resources, especially capture 
of economies of scale 
Medium – Financial backing of major technology 
firm, but lacking structure to effectively scale. 
Process too exclusive and rules are overly broad. 
Equity in distributional 
outcomes and processes 
Low – The initiative is led by a U.S.-based, 
publicly-traded firm. Rule #1 shows the emphasis 
for desired outcomes. No clear enforcement 
strategy or clear desire to adhere to international 
law. 
Legitimacy as seen by 
participants in decision 
processes 
Low – No indication that nation-states are seeking 
to adhere to or advance the DGC. Microsoft has not 
achieved a binding agreement (a goal of the DGC). 
Accountability, especially to 
direct users of resource 
Low – No clear indication of how nation-states will 
be held accountable. 
Fiscal equivalence:  the 
extent to which the 
beneficiaries of a public 
good or service are expected 
to contribute towards its 
production 
Medium – Corporations to take responsibility but 
calls for increased government support. 
Consistency with the moral 
values prevalent in that 
community 
Medium – The aims are generally in line with 
existing humanitarian precepts, but there remain 
questions about corporate stewardship. 
Robustness or resiliency Medium – CyberPeace Institute has opportunity 
establish authority in international community. This 










 Understanding how governance systems work is a vital undertaking. The use of 
economic frameworks — in this case, the IAD — can help bound problems unique to 
social situations that are otherwise too highly variable to analyze. This research makes 
some progress in the application of the IAD to global governance systems, but far more 
local research is needed to disconfirm any conclusions presented here about the current 
state of affairs, much less any future state. Ultimately, this research assesses the Tallinn 
Manual to have a high likelihood of success both in longevity as a reference book for 
state legal advisors and as a mechanism for at very least momentary consideration prior 
to conduct reaching the level of cyber warfare (though, this paper is much more 
optimistic that the international community will heed the IGE’s exercise and more readily 
recognize the international legal implications of cyber actions). Conversely, this research 
finds that the Digital Geneva Convention has low likelihood of success even if its 
longevity is propped up by a multibillion-dollar corporation. The lack of transparent 
process in its development, lack of clarity in the rules proposed, lack of open dialog and 
debate, and lack of formalization as either treaty or singular reference document, 
compounded by general eschewance of governance best practices all support this 
conclusion. Those supports stand on top of assertions made by those directly involved in 
the development of the Tallinn Manual; generally, that the DGC is a redundant work.117 
However, there is some optimism to be found in the related CyberPeace Institute, still in 
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its infancy. If the board of the CyberPeace Institute can maintain neutrality and begin a 
process similar to those utilized in the development of the Tallinn Manual, it could 
breathe new life into a DGC-like governance model. 
 In closing, I want to draw attention to the interactions exemplified in the attributes 
of community diagram found in Figure 3 and associated relative distribution of power. 
The Tallinn Manual only ever sets out to speak to a narrow set of individuals within 
government and perhaps within the militaries of nation-states, viz. legal advisors. It does 
so from a place of explicit independence, claiming to represent no state in particular 
(though, it is difficult to shake the NATO associations and paucity of representation from 
certain “adversarial” nations). This is clearly delineated at the beginning of the manual 
and it stays true to its impartiality and narrow objectives. Microsoft, on the other hand, 
used the Digital Geneva Convention to call on nation-states and potentially private sector 
companies to agree to a variety of rules and ethical guidelines. By calling its project the 
Digital Geneva Convention it necessarily imparts a sense of care for noncombatants as 
well. Success of the DGC would potentiate a shift of power to the lower right corner such 
that nation-states would be expected to do the bidding of a single, private, American 
corporation in the name of preserving human life. While corporate social responsibility 
has gained traction in recent years and the stakeholder model has in some ways eclipsed 
the traditional shareholder model, this calls for much greater philosophical debate as to 
the appropriateness of private industry as a global governor. 
 One specific question is whether Microsoft or any private industry company can 
be trusted to supplement its fiduciary responsibility with a global responsibility for the 
preservation of humanitarian values. Two years after announcing the Digital Geneva 
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Convention, WIRED reported that since 2009, Microsoft has been helping China censor 
information found via Microsoft’s search engine Bing as well as its professional 
networking platform, LinkedIn.118 Governance scholar Dan Drezner cites an even longer 
time horizon for another American tech giant:  
“In January 2006 Google agreed to create a China-based search engine 
that complied with the government’s censorship policy. Google’s 
acquiescence epitomizes the eagerness of multinational corporations to 
comply with Beijing’s demands in order to access the Chinese 
marketplace.”119 
 
 A common refrain from corporate attorneys is often to effect of, “we merely abide 
by the laws of the countries in which we operate.” If that is the case when it comes to 
suppression of freedom of speech, what guarantee can companies like Microsoft and 
Google offer that they are responsible guardians of human rights, and that those rights 
supersede the monetary incentives of market access? These problems approach the 
philosophical, but there are more local problems related to the notion of private industry 
playing a role in global governance and policymaking. 
 In fact, Charney addressed some of these issues head on in his 2014 piece, citing 
the difficulty of drawing “red lines” in complex environments. He posits that, “it is 
arguable whether [technology] companies better promote freedoms by withdrawing from 
challenging markets or by spreading communications technologies.”120 This is a 
formalization of the legal philosophy that one can’t make an omelet without breaking a 
few eggs. But Charney goes on to note that, “abandoning economic opportunities too 
quickly may be a breach of fiduciary responsibility.”121 This is a difficult point with 
which to argue, but Charney presumes that fiduciary responsibility is a generalized 
normative good. It makes sense that corporations must adhere to their fiduciary 
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responsibility, but therein lies the precise reason why it may not be to the greatest good 
that those same corporations invite themselves into governing those activities which deal 
directly with threats to human life. The moral ambiguity is palpable. Charney offers that 
there are “clearly” situations in which moral questions should come before commercial 
interests, citing controversy related to IBM’s involvement in the Holocaust, though 
history is doing a lot of work for Charney’s surety. 
 Richard Clarke spends several pages in his 2010 book Cyber War cataloging 
Microsoft’s troubling strategy and behavior within the United States government. 
Excerpts provided here:122 
• P. 139 “…Microsoft the corporation has an agenda that is very clear: don’t 
regulate security in the software industry, don’t let the Pentagon stop using our 
software no matter how many security flaws it has, and don’t say anything about 
software production overseas or deals with China. 
• P. 139 “…Microsoft is an incredibly successful empire built on the premise of 
market dominance with low-quality goods.” 
• P. 141 “Microsoft gave me the very clear impression that if the U.S. government 
promoted Linux, Microsoft would stop cooperating with the U.S. government.” 
• P. 143 Microsoft can buy a lot of spokesmen and lobbyists for a fraction of the 
cost of creating more secure systems.” 
In fairness, these statements are both anecdotal and allegedly took place over a decade 
ago. Nevertheless, as those familiar with brand management can attest, perception can 
outweigh reality; especially when it comes to security. That is not to say that Microsoft is 
disqualified or irredeemable. Still, the problem of competing interests remains and 
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perhaps more troubling than concerns over fundamental flaws in software are those 
market influences that transcend the kinds of individuated rational action (in the formal 
sense) exhibited both in the development of the DGC and in Clarke’s recounts. 
 Corporate influence in political decision making is hardly a new concept. The 
practice of lobbying is well established, and it is no secret that corporations have a vested 
interest in actively developing legislation that will support their business strategies. 
Though, special caution must be taken when business and legislation comingle on the 
battlefield. Again, this is a problem as old as Smedley Butler, yet it remains without a 
good solution. To exclude corporations from public conversation would be to ignore the 
massive impact and influence they have on technological development and public 
adoption. Cybersecurity poses the added question of responsibility for security. Herein 
lies the importance of calling up a perspective capable of dealing with complex economic 
situations. By viewing concepts like security and warfare as resources unto themselves 
and endeavoring to identify categories not otherwise descriptive of the kinds of public-
private relationships that exist today, analysts can more accurately describe and predict 
for actions more or less likely to meet societal objectives, viz. peace. 
 
Closing thoughts and next steps 
 A few thoughts for those endeavoring to apply the IAD for their own assessment 
of social systems. First is that the IAD is a framework for application, meaning that 
successful employment depends largely on the existence of an active action arena with 
discrete situations that can be observed, measured, and governed at a local level. That is 
not to say that there is no use for the IAD in understanding and governing global issues 
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such as cyber warfare (an activity whose arena remains empty). On the contrary, this 
research should provide some basis for future analysis in the event that a true cyberattack 
does take place at the nation-state level.  
 Second is that polycentricity opens wide the aperture of recursion. For instance, 
NIE theorizes that institutions are in fact the rules-in-use governing a particular arena. 
They may be formalized as laws, or they may arise as informal norms. Yet, it is often 
organizations, themselves governed by institutions, that develop those rules-in-use. As 
Ostrom shows, interactions that take place within arenas feed back into systems, opening 
the potential for externalities (from changes to exogenous rules in the interim) to affect 
evaluated outcomes. The key is to freeze a system in time rather than wrestling with 
time-continuous analysis, though discovery of how to reconcile the time factor would 
probably garner another Nobel for NIE. Those interested in the problem of cyberwarfare 
might be willing to analyze Stuxnet as a situation with a well-populated arena. 
 Another major foundational element of NIE is that certain aspects of 
neoclassicalism can be used to understand modern social problems dealing with rules 
governing behavior in particular arenas. The emphasis, however, is on the institutions 
themselves as opposed to rational actors. What I’ve found in this research is that even the 
most critical functions imaginable (matters of life and death) often come down to rational 
actor decision making. This research would benefit from careful integration of some of 
the principles elucidated by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in Essence of Decision, 
esp. regarding the Rational Actor Model. To be done effectively, this would require an 
profiling key actors involved to better understand their preferences and beliefs regarding 
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